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Comments
Trademarks: Protection of Merchandising Properties in
Professional Sports
I. INTRODUCTION
In a recent survey, nearly seventy percent of those polled either
read about, watched, or discussed sports every day.' Twenty-five
percent of those surveyed admitted to fantasizing about being a
professional athlete when participating in sports,' and given the
choice, twenty-two percent of the respondents said they would like
to be a professional athlete were it possible.' These statistics show
that the United States is infatuated with sports in general, and
that many people identify with professional athletes.
For those who follow professional sports and/or wish they were
professional athletes, several outlets exist for them to show their
allegiances and act out their dreams. The first outlet available is to
be a spectator at a professional sporting event. Second, one can
easily follow his or her favorite team or sport through the media.
Finally, one can identify with a professional sport or particular
team by owning items, usually clothing or accessories, which dis-
play the symbols, logos or trademarks of the sport or team. It is
this last method of identification with which this comment is
concerned.
"Merchandising properties include any word, name, title, sym-
bol, character or personality image, design or combination thereof
which, when used on or in association with a particular product,
will create consumer demand." 4 Merchandising properties in pro-
fessional sports consist of the trademarks of the sports leagues and
1. RESEARCH & FoRwcAsm's, THE Mi LLER LrrE REPORT ON AMERICAN ATTITUDES TOWARD
SPoETs (1983). This survey was underwritten by the makers of Miller Lite Beer at a cost of
$250,000, and was based on interviews with 1,319 men, women and teen-agers.
2. Id. at 132.
3. Id.
4. Grimes & Battersby, The Protection of Merchandising Properties, 69 TRADE-MARK
REP. 431 (1979).
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their member teams.5 Sports merchandising properties can be fur-
ther classified as popularity properties-those that achieve public
recognition as a result of a mass media campaign of a primary
product or service.' As a result of such recognition, popularity
properties can then be used on other secondary products to create
consumer demand.
The most successful applications of sports merchandising
properties are those which involve the use of merchandising
properties in connection with low-priced "impulse" products. The
products to which the National Football League (NFL) trademarks
have been applied are exemplary of the inexpensive, "impulse"
items on which these popularity properties are used. Products dis-
playing NFL team colors and insignias range from adults' and chil-
drens' sweaters, tee shirts, jerseys, and socks to glassware, key
rings, posters, and buttons.'. Because of the success of such mer-
chandising campaigns, the number of different products on which
these properties have been applied has increased dramatically,8
and the range of future products is limited only by the imagination
of the merchandising property owner.
The sports merchandising property owner oftentimes is either
incapable of or unwilling to manufacture the wide variety of prod-
ucts on which his trademark may be applied. As a result, the
trademark owner will in most instances license others to produce
and sell such products. In professional sports, this licensing pro-
gram is established through either an exclusive licensing agent re-
tained by the league and its member teams, or through a wholly-
owned licensing subsidiary of the league.8
5. "The term 'trade-mark' includes any word, name, symbol, or device or any combi-
nation thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and
distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by others." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976). This
definition is applicable for all trademarks whether federally registered or at common law.
The terms "trademark" and "mark" are used as synonyms throughout this comment.
6. Grimes & Battersby, supra note 4, at 433. Other classifications of merchandising
properties are "status properties," recognized status symbols that are used on or in associa-
tion with merchandising products to create demand by consumers who seek to surround
themselves with visual indicators of a particular financial fashion or social status or who
desire high quality products and believe that such products will be of the desired quality,
and "personification properties," properties that arise from the public's conception of the
characteristics of persons who use products with which the properties are associated. Id. at
432-33.
7. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PROPERTIES, INC., 1982 NFL MERCHANDISE CATALOG
1982.
8. See, e.g., id.
9. Examples of exclusive licensing agents in professional sports include: Licensing Cor-
poration of America for Major League Baseball and the National Hockey League, and Rob-
928 Vol. 21:927
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The licensing of sports merchandising properties has become big
business. For example, the licensing of NFL merchandising proper-
ties has been a multi-million dollar business for several years.10
National Football League Properties license over 350 different
products. 1 The reason for this immense success: the public's desire
to identify with their favorite sports team.
The licensing program essentially consists of two phases. The
first step is to secure the statutory protection best able to serve the
property owner's needs in the event of possible infringement. 2 The
second step is to establish a policing and enforcement program
early on, with an active enforcement program recommended. I s
Because the market for goods bearing sports merchandising
properties is so lucrative, there are a large number of counterfeit-
ers who attempt to capitalize on the goodwill and market estab-
lished by the professional sports leagues and their member teams.
The property owner's first problem is to locate the infringer and
attempt to bring this infringing activity to a halt. Quite often the
infringer disregards the property owner's demands and continues
ert Landau Associates, Inc. for the newly formed United States Football League. Examples
of wholly-owned licensing subsidiaries include: National Football League Properties for the
National Football League and National Basketball Association Properties for the National
Basketball Association.
10. Telephone interview with James Noel, Director of Legal Affairs for NFLP (Mar. 7,
1983).
11. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE PROPERTIES, INC., 1982 NFL MERCHANDISE CATALOG
1982.
12. In addition to securing federal trademark registration for sports merchandising
properties, statutory protection is also available under the design patent laws, see 35 U.S.C.
§§ 171-173 (1976), and copyright laws, see 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (Supp. V 1981). However,
since no major difficulties are usually encountered in obtaining design patent and copyright
protection for sports properties, such protection will not be further considered in this
comment.
13. Some property owners choose to wait for their licensees to complain and, only
then, selectively enforce their rights. Inaction or selective enforcement presents several
problems. First, it could alienate licensees who have to compete with unlicensed goods that
are cheaper. Inaction also entices potential licensees to forego licensing and take the risk of
marketing unlicensed products, resulting in the loss of royalty monies to the property own-
er. Finally, and most importantly, inaction may prejudice the property rights and provide
defenses in future infringement actions. Grimes & Battersby, supra note 4, at 446. A delay
in bringing an infringement action may bar a recovery based on the doctrine of laches. See
Mego Corp. v. Mattel, Inc., 203 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 377 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1978) (Mego's delay
of six months in bringing an infringement action tipped the scales in the defendant's favor).
Inaction may even result in the eventual loss of the property right. A continual pattern of
unlicensed and thus uncontrolled use may give rise to an abandonment defense under § 45
of the Lanham Act. "A mark shall be deemed to be 'abandoned'. . . (b) when any course of
conduct of the registrant, including acts of omission as well as commission, causes the mark
to lose its significance as an indication of origin." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1976).
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his infringing activities. As a result, the property owner is left with
no other alternative but to pursue legal action to enforce his mer-
chandising property rights."' Actions to enjoin the infringement of
sports merchandising property rights normally are formed around
three legal theories: trademark infringement under section 32(1) of
the Lanham Act,15 false designation of origin under section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act," and common law unfair competition. 17 Often,
several or all of these legal theories are combined.
To seek relief for trademark infringement under section 32(1) of
the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must first have secured a federal trade-
mark registration. Upon proof of a validly registered trademark,
the plaintiff must prove five elements to establish federal trade-
mark infringement. The plaintiff must establish (1) that the defen-
dant used a substantial duplication of plaintiffs' trademark; (2)
without the plaintiffs' consent; (3) in interstate commerce; (4) in
connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution or advertis-
ing of goods; and (5) that the infringing use is likely to cause con-
fusion.18 The majority of professional sports leagues and member
14. An active enforcement program is well illustrated by National Football League
Properties (NFLP). NFLP has investigators in each NFL city to investigate claims of trade-
mark infringement. Complaints are received from licensees, retailers, consumers, and vari-
ous other sources. In every instance, NFLP takes appropriate action to protect the trade-
marks. NFLP first sends the infringer a cease and desist letter, and most often these
matters are settled amicably. National Football League Properties v. Wichita Falls Sports-
wear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 655 (W.D. Wash. 1982). If necessary, however, NFLP will pur-
sue legal action to enforce its trademark rights. See, e.g., id.
15. Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act reads in pertinent part:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imi-
tation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distri-
bution or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which
such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive . . .
shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for the remedies hereinafter
provided.
15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1976).
16. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act reads in pertinent part:
(a) Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with any
goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of ori-
gin, or any false description or representation, including words or other symbols tend-
ing falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to
enter into commerce. . .shall be liable to a civil action by any person doing business
in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in which said locality
is situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be damaged by the
use of any such false description or representation.
15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1976).
17. See infra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
18. See supra note 15. Whether there is a likelihood of confusion is a question of fact,
and courts will consider a number of factors to guide the fact-finding process. These include:
930
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teams can pursue such an action because they have secured federal
trademark registration as the cornerstone of their merchandising
program."'
In order to sue for false designation of origin under section 43(a)
of the Lanham Act, it is not necessary for a mark or trademark to
be registered. 0 The plaintiff must first establish that the public
recognizes the plaintiffs' trademark as identifying his goods or ser-
vices and distinguishing them from those of others. 1 This public
recognition can be shown in either of two ways: that the plaintiff's
symbol was inherently distinctive,2 2 or, if not inherently distinc-
tive, that the symbol has become distinctive through the acquisi-
tion of secondary meaning.2 s The plaintiff must then show that the
defendant used in commerce the plaintiffs' mark in a manner
likely to confuse or deceive the public about the origin of goods.24
Common law unfair competition embraces a broad spectrum of
(1) the strength of the plaintiff's mark; (2) the defendant's purpose in adopting its mark; (3)
the degree of similarity between the marks; (4) the degree of similarity between the prod-
ucts; (5) the competitive proximity of the products; (6) actual confusion; (7) the degree of
care likely to be exercised by consumers; and (8) consumer surveys. See, Grotrian, Helffer-
ich, Schultz, Th. Steinweg Nachf v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1336 (2d Cir. 1975).
19. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
20. See supra note 16. See also New W. Corp. v. NYM Co. of Cal., 595 F.2d 1194, 1198
(9th Cir. 1979).
21. 1 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPErrIoN, § 15:1 at 514 (1976).
22. Id. Fanciful and arbitrary marks are the most common types of marks which are
considered "inherently distinctive." Fanciful marks consist of coined words which have been
invented for the express purpose of serving as a trademark. These marks consist of words
which are either totally unknown in the language or are totally out of common usage at the
time. "Arbitrary marks comprise those words, symbols, pictures, etc. which are in common
linguistic use but which, when used with the goods or services in issue, neither suggest nor
describe any ingredient, quality or characteristic of those goods or services." Id. §§ 11:2-11:4
at 346-52.
23. Id. Secondary meaning primarily denotes a mental recognition or association in
buyers' minds that products connected with the symbol or mark originate from or are asso-
ciated with the same source. Id. § 15:2 at 516. See National Football League Properties, Inc.
v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 658 (W.D. Wash. 1982). One court has
defined secondary meaning as association, nothing more. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Proctor &
Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794, 802 (9th Cir. 1970). It does not matter if the public does not
know the specific identity of the single source as long as the public associates the product
bearing the mark with a single, though anonymous, source. Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-
Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976); 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra
note 21, § 15:2 at 520-21.
To make a determination of secondary meaning, courts will consider the following fac-
tors: (1) consumer surveys; (2) consumer testimony; (3) the length and manner of plaintiff's
use of its mark; (4) the nature and extent of plaintiff's advertising and promotion of its
mark; (5) volume of sales; (6) number of customers; and (7) defendant's conscious copying of
plaintiff's mark. See 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 21, §§ 15:10 - 15:21 at 538-56.
24. See supra note 18.
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dealings in the marketplace. The law of trademark infringement is
just one type of unfair competition.16 Trademark infringement re-
lates to the narrow question of the use of a mark to distinguish a
product; unfair competition relates to the broader issue of the ef-
fect on the consumer of the general impressions created upon him
by the products, each product viewed as a whole.26 Thus, it is pos-
sible to compete unfairly without having technically infringed a
mark.27 Upon a showing of secondary meaning, the basic test for
unfair competition is the same as for trademark infringement and
false designation of origin-whether the defendant's activities have
created a likelihood of confusion. 8
In pursuing legal action to enforce a trademark, the trademark
owner is usually confronted with several defenses to his claims of
trademark infringement, false designation of origin, and unfair
competition. The most controversial is the contention that the
plaintiffs' mark is functional and therefore not subject to trade-
mark status.2 9 One of the essential features of trademark law, de-
veloped in the common law of unfair competition, is the principle
25. "There is no essential difference between trademark infringement and what is
loosely called unfair competition. Unfair competition is the genus of which trademark in-
fringement is one of the species . . . . All trademark cases are cases of unfair competition
and involve the same legal wrong." S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in
1946 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1275.
Other actions which constitute unfair competition include: use of similar corporate, bus-
iness and professional names; simulation of a container or product configuration; misappro-
priation; false representations and false advertising; theft of trade secrets; and a former em-
ployee's solicitation of his employer's customers by use of confidential information. 1 J.
McCARTHY, supra note 21, § 1:5 at 14-15.
26. Liability for unfair competition can result from the buyer's likely confusion be-
tween two products or services based upon the total impact of all aspects of the par-
ties' selling efforts. In unfair competition, every facet of the parties' selling program is
relevant-from the symbols, letters, pictures, colors, shapes and sizes connected with
the products to the advertising representations made. In unfair competition, every-
thing that is likely to have an impact upon the purchaser is relevant to the ultimate
determination of whether there is probable "unfairness" or confusion by those
purchasers.
I J. MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 2:2 at 45 (footnote omitted).
27. See, e.g., Fotomat Corp. v. Photo Drive Thru, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 693, 708-09
(D.C.N.J. 1977) ("[i]t is possible to be guilty of unfair competition even when trademark
infringement is not present, if use of a similar but noninfringing mark or device is combined
with unfair practices in a manner which is likely to deceive purchasers regarding the origin
of goods under all the circumstances").
28. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 2:3 at 46. See National Football League Proper-
ties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 657 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
29. Although a sports trademark owner normally encounters other defenses when at-
tempting to enforce his rights, they are not as controversial as functionality and therefore
will not be the object of discussion in this comment.
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that no legal protection is available for products or features that
are functional. 0 The policy behind the rule was to prevent the
grant of a perpetual monopoly in the form of a trademark where a
patent had expired or could not be granted.3 1
The problem with the doctrine of functionality resides in the
fact that the courts which have had occasion to consider it have
defined the doctrine in numerous ways. Many courts have defined
functionality in a strictly utilitarian sense, holding that any feature
of a product which was essential to the utility of the product was
functional. 2 Some courts have adopted a broader definition of
functionality, holding that any feature of an article that appeals to
a consumer and enhances its saleability is functional." This view
appears to accept the rationale that when an aesthetic feature of a
product controls the buyer's choice, the feature is functional.34 The
broad view of functionality, commonly referred to as aesthetic
functionality, poses a problem to the protection of products bear-
ing sports merchandising properties. Admittedly, these products
sell because of the presence of the trademarks, but they also sell
because the trademarks operate to indicate sponsorship or origin
with the sports team. The problem arises when the court does not
acknowledge that in addition to incidently being aesthetically
pleasing, the trademarks of the teams at the same time indicate
30. See 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 21, § 7:23 at 189; Note, Unfair Competition and
the Doctrine of Functionality, 64 COLUM. L. Rv. [hereinafter cited as Note, Unfair Compe-
tition], 544, 552 (1964); Note, The Problem of Functional Features: Trade Dress Infringe-
ment Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 77 (1982).
31. Sylvania Elect. Prods., Inc. v. Dura Elec. Lamp Co., 247 F.2d 730, 732 (3d Cir.
1957). See also Pope Automatic Merchandising Co. v. McCrum-Howell Co., 191 F. 979 (7th
Cir. 1911), where the court of appeals stated:
If one manufacturer should make an advance in effectiveness of operation, or in sim-
plicity of form, or in utility of color; and if that advance did not entitle him to a
monopoly by means of a machine or process or a product or a design patent; and if by
means of unfair trade secrets he could shut out any other manufacturers who plainly
intended to share in the benefits of unpatented utilities ... he would be given gratu-
itously a monopoly more effective than that of the unobtainable patent in the ratio of
eternity to seventeen years.
Id. at 981-82.
32. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Parafiex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981). See
also supra note 31.
33. See, e.g., Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952); J. C. Penney
Co. v. H.D. Lee Mercantile Co., 120 F.2d 949 (8th Cir. 1941). See also RESTATEmENT OF
ToRTs, § 742, comment a (1938).
34. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670 (D.C.N.Y. 1963),
where the district court reached this conclusion after examining the line of cases which
adopted a broad view of functionality.
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sponsorship or origin with the team.3 5
This comment will discuss the protection of merchandising
properties in professional sports.36 First, the protection of team in-
signias and symbols will be described. Next, the protection of team
uniforms and jerseys will be discussed. Both forms of properties
will be analyzed by looking at case law specifically dealing with
sports properties, as well as examining analogous case law which
lends a relevant perspective to the discussion. Finally, these legal
principles will be discussed in light of relevant policy considera-
tions supporting the protection of sports merchandising properties.
II. TEAM INSIGNIAS AND SYMBOLS
A. Sports Cases
The landmark case in this area is the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Boston Professional Hockey Association v. Dallas Cap & Emblem
Manufacturing, Inc., 7  where the court of appeals considered
whether the duplication and sale of the individual National Hock-
ey League (NHL) team symbols on embroidered patches violated
any rights of the NHL or its member teams. Each plaintiff as-
35. See International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633 F.2d 912 (9th
Cir. 1980).
36. The protection of merchandising properties in collegiate athletics will not be dis-
cussed in this comment. The principal reason for this omission is that the majority of col-
leges and universities around the country do not have any type of merchandising program to
protect their properties. Very few schools obtain statutory protection for their marks, and
those that do lack a licensing program. However, this practice will no doubt change with the
recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in University of Pittsburgh v.
Champion Prods., Inc., 686 F.2d 1040 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 571 (1982). The
plaintiff filed suit for trademark infringement and unfair competition to enjoin defendant's
use of the marks "University of Pittsburgh," "Pitt," "Panthers," and "Pitt Panthers." The
defendant was engaged in the business of manufacturing and marketing "soft goods," ap-
proximately 80% of which were imprinted with the names and/or symbols of colleges, uni-
versities and other entities. The names and/or insignias of over 10,000 schools, colleges, and
universities appeared on defendant's goods, without any licensing arrangement or royalty
payments to any of the schools. The only issue before the court of appeals was whether the
plaintiff's claims were barred by the affirmative defense of laches. The court of appeals held
that the defendant did not prove laches on the plaintiff's part. The case was then remanded
to the district court to hear the issues of functionality, secondary meaning, and likelihood of
confusion.
This decision is significant because it has cleared the way for colleges and universities
to implement trademark licensing programs to receive badly needed revenues. The schools
will, however, encounter the defenses of functionality, lack of secondary meaning, and likeli-
hood of confusion when attempting to enforce their rights. Note that Champion has licens-
ing agreements with professional sports, but that it refuses to recognize the trademark
rights of colleges and universities. Id. at 1042 & n.5.
37. 510 F.2d 1004 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 868 (1975).
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serted a cause of action for common law unfair competition. 8 The
NHL and all but one of the individual teams had secured federal
service mark registrations 9 for their team symbols for ice hockey
entertainment services and sought relief for trademark infringe-
ment under section 32(1) of the Lanham Act, 0 and for false desig-
nation of origin under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.4 1 The To-
ronto team had not obtained federal registration of its symbol, and
thus was restricted to section 43(a), which encompasses unregis-
tered marks. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed
the decision of the district court4 ' and held for the plaintiffs on all
counts.
With respect to trademark infringement, the court of appeals
stated that the first three elements of a cause of action were clearly
satisfied since the defendant had used the mark without the plain-
tiffs' consent in interstate commerce."s As to the fourth element of
trademark infringement, that the infringing use of the mark must
be in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution or
advertising of any goods, the court held that although the symbol
covered the entire face of the defendant's product, there would
have been no market for a bare patch without the plaintiffs'
symbols."
38. The plaintiffs consisted of the National Hockey League and thirteen of its member
teams. Id. at 1008.
39. "The term 'service mark' means a mark used in the sale or advertising of services
to identify the services of one person and distinguish them from the services of others." 15
U.S.C. § 1127 (1976).
The term "trademark" encompasses "service marks" and thus, service marks are af-
forded the same protection given to trademarks. "Subject to the provisions relating to the
registration of trade-marks. . . service marks used in commerce shall be registrable, in the
same manner and with the same effect as are trade-marks, and when registered they shall be
entitled to the protection provided in this chapter in the case of trademarks . Id. §
1053.
40. Id. § 1114. See supra note 15.
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1976). See supra note 16.
42. 360 F. Supp. 459 (N.D. Tex. 1973). The district court was of the opinion that to
give the plaintiffs protection in this case would be equivalent to the creation of a copyright
monopoly for designs which were not copyrighted. Id. at 464. The district court did, how-
ever, enjoin the defendant from manufacturing and selling NHL patches without appropri-
ate disclaimers of authorization and/or conspicuous designations of source placed on either
the emblem or the package and stated: "This remedy serves the interests of the public by
preserving competition in the product while eliminating any unfair appropriation of plain-
tiffs' good will as originators." Id. at 465.
43. 510 F.2d at 1011. "Plaintiffs' marks are validly registered and defendant manufac-
tured and sold emblems which were (1) substantial duplications of the marks; (2) without
plaintiffs' consent, and (3) in interstate commerce." Id.
44. Id. "The conclusion is inescapable that, without plaintiffs' marks, defendant would
not have a market for his particular product among ice hockey fans desiring to purchase
Duquesne Law Review Vol. 21:927
The final element of a cause of action for trademark infringe-
ment is that the infringing use is likely to cause confusion, or to
cause mistake, or to deceive. The district court had held that there
was no likelihood of confusion because the typical purchaser, a
sports fan in his local sporting goods store, would not be likely to
think that the defendant's emblems were manufactured by or con-
nected with his favorite hockey team." On appeal, the court stated
that the district court overlooked the fact that the Lanham Act
was amended to eliminate "source of origin" as being the only focal
point of confusion,46 and held that the confusion requirement was
met by the fact that the defendant knew that the public would
identify the emblems as being the teams' trademark.
Having found infringement of the plaintiffs' registered marks,
the court of appeals concluded that defendant's use of the Toronto
team's unregistered mark was a false designation of origin under
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. The court found likelihood of
confusion as to the source of the emblems48 and that the defendant
emblems embroidered with the symbols of their favorite teams." Id.
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has consistently refused to deny registration
of trademarks on the ground that they cover the entire surface of the product. See, e.g., In
re Todd Co., 290 F.2d 597 (C.C.P.A. 1961) (mark was capable of being registered even
though the mark was employed in a pattern covering the entire back surface of the
product).
45. 510 F.2d at 1012.
46. Section 32 of the Lanham Act originally provided that the use of the mark must be
"likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive purchasers as to the source of
origin of such goods or services." Lanham Act, ch. 540, § 32, 60 Stat. 427, 437 (1946)
(amended 1962) (emphasis added). In 1962, this section was amended to delete the italicized
portion. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1976).
47. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stated:
The confusion question here is conceptually difficult. It can be said that the public
buyer knew that the emblems portrayed the teams' symbols. Thus, it can be argued,
the buyer is not confused or deceived. This argument misplaces the purpose of the
confusion requirement. The confusion or deceit requirement is met by the fact that
the defendant duplicated the protected trademarks and sold them to the public
knowing that the public would identify them as being the teams' trademarks. The
certain knowledge of the buyer that the source and origin of the trademark symbols
were in plaintiffs satisfies the requirement of the act. The argument that confusion
must be as to the source of the manufacture of the emblem itself is unpersuasive,
where the trademark, originated by the team, is the triggering mechanism for the sale
of the emblem.
510 F.2d at 1012.
In finding a likelihood of confusion to exist, it appears that the court of appeals was
strongly influenced by the fact that the defendant intentionally duplicated plaintiffs' sym-
bols. See infra notes 206-09 and accompanying text.
48. "Our decision that confusion is self-evident from the nature of defendant's use of
plaintiffs' marks applies with equal force in plaintiff Toronto's case." 510 F.2d at 1012.
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falsely represented the origin of the emblems. 9 As to the plaintiffs'
final cause of action for unfair competition, the court of appeals
held that substantial evidence was present to support the district
court's finding of unfair competition."0
In extending Lanham Act protection to the plaintiffs, the court
of appeals rejected defendant's argument that the plaintiffs'
marks, when embroidered on emblems for wearing apparel, are
functional and, thus, serve no trademark purpose. The court con-
cluded that the emblems sold because they bore the identifiable
marks of the plaintiffs and that this fact distinguished the case
from Pagliero v. Wallace China Co.,51 upon which the district
court had relied. The Pagliero court had held that designs on chi-
i aware were functional because the attractiveness and eye-appeal
of the design sold the china, not the trademark character of the
designs.5 2 The Fifth Circuit, however, distinguished Pagliero by
holding that the embroidered symbols were sold because they were
the trademarks of the hockey teams, not because of any aesthetic
appeal, and therefore were not functional.'"
The Boston Hockey decision is significant in that the court ap-
49. "In the case sub judice, defendant did not merely copy a product of the Toronto
team. Defendant reproduced Toronto's common law mark on embroidered emblems with
the intent that the public recognize and purchase the emblems as the symbol of the Toronto
team." Id.
50. Id. at 1013. Although affirming the finding of unfair competition, the court of ap-
peals reversed the finding that the unfair competition could be rendered fair by the dis-
claimer ordered by the district court. The court of appeals stated that only a prohibition of
the unauthorized copying would sufficiently remedy the situation. Id.
51. 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952). In Pagliero, the plaintiff claimed trademark infringe-
ment of the designs it used on its china. The designs were neither trademarked, patented
nor copyrighted. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found no infringement because the
design served primarily as a functional part of the product. In oft-cited language, the Pag-
liero court explained the term "functional" as follows:
'Functional'... might be said to connote other than a trade-mark purpose. If the
particular feature is an important ingredient in the commercial success of the prod-
uct, the interest in free competition permits its imitation in the absence of a patent
or copyright. On the other hand, where the feature or, more aptly, design is a mere
arbitrary embellishment, a form of dress for the goods primarily adopted for purposes
of identification and individuality and, hence, unrelated to basic consumer demands
in connection with the product, imitation may be forbidden where the requisite show-
ing of secondary meaning is made. Under such circumstances, since effective competi-
tion may be undertaken without imitation, the law grants protection.
Id. at 343 (citations omitted). The Pagliero court then applied these criteria to classify the
designs in question as functional, finding that the designs were an important ingredient in
the commercial success of the china. Id. at 343-44.
52. Id.
53. 510 F.2d at 1013. In reaching this conclusion, the court of appeals did not ex-
pressly state whether they adopted a broad view or a narrow view of functionality.
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peared to have broadened the definition of "confusion" as used in
the Lanham Act. The court found confusion to exist because the
plaintiffs had popularized their marks, authorized their use on a
wide variety of products, and the public expected goods bearing
their marks, even representation of the marks themselves, to origi-
nate from or be authorized by the teams identified by the sym-
bols.5 The court acknowledged that its decision may slightly tilt
the trademark law from the purpose of protecting the public to the
protection of the business interests of the plaintiffs, but that both
the public and the plaintiffs would be better served by granting
relief to the plaintiffs. 5
In similar cases, involving National Football League Properties,
the Illinois Appellate Court held that the unlicensed sale of em-
broidered cloth emblems of the team symbols of the NFL consti-
tuted common law unfair competition.56 The Illinois court ruled
that the NFL had a property right that was entitled to protection
because the symbols had acquired a strong secondary meaning of
identification of the member clubs through the expenditure of
large sums of money by the NFL and its member clubs. 7 The
court further found that the defendant's copying and application
of these trademarks to bare patches caused the purchasing public
to associate the patches with the sponsorship of the NFL and its
member teams because of the popularity and public recognition
that the football teams and their symbols enjoyed." The appellate
court rejected the defendant's contention that the symbols were
not used on the patches as trademarks but merely as decorative
ornaments, finding instead that the marks were duplicated because
54. Id. at 1011.
55. Id. In granting relief, the Boston Hockey court underlined three "persuasive"
points:
First, the major commercial value of the emblems is derived from the efforts of plain-
tiffs. Second, defendant sought and ostensibly would have asserted, if obtained, an
exclusive right to make and sell the emblems. Third, the sale of a reproduction of the
trademark itself on an emblem is an accepted use of such team symbols in connection
with the type of activity in which the business of professional sports is engaged.
Id. (emphasis in original).
56. National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Consumer Enters. Inc., 26 Ill. App. 3d
814, 327 N.E.2d 242 (1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1976); National Football League
Properties, Inc. v. Dallas Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 26 Ill. App. 3d 820, 327 N.E.2d 247
(1975).
The appellate court affirmed the trial court's orders enjoining the manufacture and sale
by defendants of emblems bearing the trademarks of the NFL teams.
57. 26 Ill. App. 3d at 817, 327 N.E.2d at 245.
58. Id. at 818, 327 N.E.2d at 246.
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they were associated with highly successful football teams.59 The
court concluded that the symbols served as indicators of source or
origin, despite their aesthetic value.60
Using logic similar to Boston Hockey, the Illinois Appellate
Court predicated their decision on the fact that the symbols had
acquired a strong secondary meaning of identification of the mem-
ber clubs. Unlike Boston Hockey, however, the Illinois court did
not attempt to articulate the precise basis for its finding of confu-
sion. Finally, both the Boston Hockey and NFL Properties courts
were influenced by the presence of licensing programs by both the
NHL and NFL.61
B. Analogous Cases
The rationale and holding of Boston Hockey has been analyzed
in several cases dealing with the use of insignias and symbols as
trademarks of fraternal organizations. Although not sports related,
these cases are analogous to the sports cases in several respects.
First, similar to professional sports teams, fraternal organizations
employ an insignia or symbol to serve as a trademark to identify
their particular organization. Second, these cases raise the same is-
sues as the sports cases: secondary meaning, likelihood of confu-
sion, and the doctrine of aesthetic functionality.
In Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J. H. Ray
Jewelry Co., 62 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently
had occasion to discuss its decision in Boston Hockey. Rainbow, a
fraternal organization, 6 brought suit alleging trademark infringe-
ment and false designation of origin under the Lanham Act, and
common law unfair competition in defendant's sale of jewelry bear-
ing the registered collective mark" of the organization," but not
59. Id. at 819, 327 N.E.2d at 247. The defendant based his argument on the district
court decision in Boston Hockey, which held that the symbols of the NHL teams sold as
embroidered emblems by defendant were merely decorations. The Illinois Appellate Court
rejected the reasoning of the district court, stating that the marks of the NFL teams had
strongly established secondary meaning as to sponsorship by the NFL, and that disclaimer
protection would not protect the property rights built up through the efforts of the NFL. Id.
at 819, 327 N.E.2d at 247.
60. Id.
61. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
62. 676 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1982).
63. The organization consists of member girls between the ages of 12 and 20 whose
families have Masonic connections. Id. at 1080.
64. "The term 'collective mark' means a trademark or service mark used by the mem-
bers of a cooperative, an association or other collective group or organization and includes
marks used to indicate membership in a union, an association or other organization." 15
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manufactured by Stange, the official jeweler of the organization."
In affirming the district court's decision, the court of appeals held
that Rainbow was not entitled to the relief it sought because it
failed to prove any likelihood of confusion.6
7
In failing to find likelihood of confusion as to origin, approval,
endorsement, or some other association, the Rainbow court distin-
guished Boston Hockey in two major respects. First, in Rainbow
the court found no reasonable basis for buyers of Rainbow jewelry
to assume that such jewelry could only be manufactured with
Rainbow's sponsorship or approval, noting that most fraternal or-
ganizations exercise little or no control over the manufacture of
jewelry bearing their fraternal emblems, and that until recently
Rainbow's policy towards unauthorized Rainbow jewelry was simi-
lar to that of most fraternal associations.68 Boston Hockey differed
in that it was reasonable to conclude, considering the degree to
which sports emblems are used to advertise teams and endorse
products, that a consumer seeing the emblem or name of a team on
or associated with goods or services would assume some type of
sponsorship or approval between the product's seller and the
team.
s
The second fact distinguishing Boston Hockey was that Stange's
status as Rainbow's official jeweler was well known through adver-
tising, and that this advertising, combined with the use of Stange's
own distinctive mark on Stange manufactured jewelry, 0 created
the strong inference for customers that all other Rainbow jewelry
U.S.C. § 1127 (1976).
The term 'trademark' encompasses 'collective mark,' and thus, collective marks are af-
forded the same protection given to trademarks. "Subject to the provisions relating to the
registration of trade-marks . . . collective . . . marks . . . shall be registrable under this
chapter, in the same manner and with the same effect as are trademarks . . . and when
registered they shall be entitled to the protection provided in this chapter in the case of
trade-marks . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 1054 (1976).
65. The mark consisted of a representation of clasped hands, on top of which sits a
triangle enclosing the letter "R". Above the hands and the triangle is a rainbow containing
the letters "B," "F," "C," and "L." 676 F.2d at 1080.
66. Stange had an agreement with Rainbow under which Stange was licensed to manu-
facture jewelry bearing the Rainbow mark and in which Rainbow agreed to purchase its
jewelry requirements from Stange at certain price discounts. Id. at 1081.
67. Rainbow's claims of trademark infringement, false designation of origin, and un-
fair competition all failed because a requirement of each cause of action is the presence of a
likelihood of confusion. See supra note 18.
68. 676 F.2d at 1083.
69. Id. at 1085.
70. Stange manufactured jewelry is identified by Stange's own distinctive trademark,
the letter "S." Id. at 1081, 1083.
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is not endorsed, sponsored, approved or otherwise associated with
Rainbow.7" The fact that official Rainbow jewelry was identified
not by the Rainbow mark but by the Stange mark justifies the con-
clusion that consumers were not likely to be confused by the pres-
ence of the Rainbow emblem on non-Stange Rainbow jewelry sold
by the defendant.7 2 In Boston Hockey, however, the manufacturer
who held the exclusive license to manufacture embroidered em-
blems was not advertised at all, and did not place his own distinc-
tive mark on the emblems.
In examining the Rainbow case, it appears that the Fifth Circuit
has retreated from some of the broader language in Boston Hock-
ey. The Boston Hockey court disposed of the confusion issue on a
showing that buyers knew of the source and origin of the trade-
mark symbol, as opposed to the source of the product itself.7 The
Rainbow court, however, noted that Boston Hockey does not auto-
matically equate awareness of a symbol's origin with confusion suf-
ficient to establish trademark infringement. 74 Instead, the question
in every case is whether knowledge of the origin of the symbols
supports the inference that many of the product's typical purchas-
ers would believe that the product itself originated with or was in
some way endorsed by the owner of the mark.7
In addition to finding that Rainbow failed to prove the requisite
likelihood of confusion, the district court also found that Rainbow
had failed to prove that their emblem operated as a trademark
when used as a design for jewelry.7 " The district court noted the
relationship between likelihood of confusion and functional pur-
pose, stating that the more functional a feature is, the less likely it
is that consumers will view it as a distinctive symbol of origin. 7
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, did not address the
meaning and application of the doctrine of functionality because of
their affirmation of the district court's finding of no likelihood of
71. Id. at 1083.
72. Id. at 1084.
73. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
74. 676 F.2d at 1085. See also Kentucky Fried Chicken Corp. v. Diversified Packaging
Corp., 549 F.2d 368 (5th Cir. 1977), where the court began its analysis of the plaintiffs'
infringement claim by noting that it "reject[ed] any notion that a trademark is an owner's
'property' to be protected irrespective of its role in the operation of our markets," and de-
scribed the Boston Hockey decision as predicated on a finding that consumers were likely to
believe that the emblems originated from the hockey clubs in some manner. Id at 389.
75. 676 F.2d at 1085.





The Boston Hockey decision has been met with mixed reaction
in the Ninth Circuit. In International Order of Job's Daughters v.
Lindeburg & Co., 79 the court of appeals was faced with a situation
similar to that in Rainbow. Job's Daughters, a young women's fra-
ternal organization, brought an action alleging false designation of
origin in the defendant's unauthorized sale of jewelry bearing the
common law trademark of the organization."0 Acknowledging that
"[t]rademark law does not prevent a person from copying so-called
'functional' features of a product which constitute the actual bene-
fit that the consumer wishes to purchase, as distinguished from an
assurance that a particular entity made, sponsored, or endorsed a
product," the court of appeals found the Job's Daughters name
and emblem to be functional as aesthetic components of the jew-
elry, rather than designations of origin or sponsorship.81 The court
of appeals was strongly influenced by the lack of licensing and con-
trol over third parties. 2
The Ninth Circuit rejected Boston Hockey, upon which the
plaintiffs had relied, interpreting that case to hold that a trade-
mark's owner has a complete monopoly over its use, including its
functional use, in commercial merchandising.8 " Stating that a
trademark owner has a property right only of a scope necessary. to
prevent consumer confusion as to who manufactured the goods and
to differentiate the trademark owner's goods from other goods, the
court held that Boston Hockey was an extraordinary extension of
78. Id. A review of functionality was not necessary since the district court's finding of
no likelihood of confusion was not clearly erroneous nor based on a misapplication of the
governing legal standards. Id.
79 633 F.2d 912 (9th Cir. 1980).
80. Job's Daughters did not obtain federal registration for their emblem, which con-
sisted essentially of a representation of three girls within a double triangle. Id. at 920.
81. Id. at 917. The court of appeals applied the Pagliero test of functionality and con-
cluded that although the Job's Daughters insignia is used to identify the organization and
that its members wear the jewelry to identify themselves as members, the facts of this case
supported the conclusion that the emblem and name "are functional aesthetic components
of the jewelry, in that they are being merchandised on the basis of their intrinsic value, not
as a designation of origin or sponsorship." Id. at 918.
82. Id. at 920.
83. Id. at 918. The court of appeals stated:
[O]ur reading of the Lanham Act and its legislative history reveals no congressional
design to bestow such broad property rights on trademark owners. Its scope is much
narrower: to protect consumers against deceptive designations of the origin of goods
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the protection afforded trademark owners.8 4
Although denying relief, the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that a
name or emblem could serve simultaneously as a functional com-
ponent of a product as well as a trademark."8 If the typical con-
sumer not only purchased the jewelry for its functional features,
but also inferred from the Job's Daughters' name and emblem that
the jewelry was produced, sponsored or endorsed by Job's Daugh-
ters, then it is possible that the name and emblem could serve sec-
ondarily as trademarks.8 6 To answer this question, the court of ap-
peals stated that a court must closely scrutinize the following
factors: the articles themselves, the defendant's merchandising
practices, and any available factual evidence that consumers have
actually inferred some connection between the defendant's product
and the trademark owner.87 Using these criteria, the court of ap-
peals concluded that the Job's Daughters' name and emblem did
not serve a trademark purpose in addition to being functional aes-
thetic components of the jewelry.88
The force of Job's Daughters has been substantially vitiated,
however, by the subsequent decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of
84. Id. at 919. "The Boston Hockey court decided that broader protection was desira-
ble. In our view, this extends the protection beyond that intended by Congress and beyond
that accorded by any other court." Id. (citation omitted).
85. Id. (citing Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d
200, 204 (2d Cir. 1979), where the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a cheerleading
outfit served as a valid trademark in addition to serving the functional purpose of clothing).
In recognizing this principle, the Job's Daughters court stated:
Our holding does not mean that a name or emblem could not serve simultaneously as
a functional component of a product and a trademark. That is, even if the Job's
Daughters' name and emblem when inscribed on Lindeburg's jewelry, served primar-
ily a functional purpose, it is possible that they could serve secondarily as trademarks
if the typical customer not only purchased the jewelry for its intrinsic functional use
and aesthetic appeal but also inferred from the insignia that the jewelry was pro-
duced, sponsored or endorsed by Job's Daughters. 633 F.2d at 919 (citations omitted).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 920. The court of appeals examined the trial court record and based its
conclusion on the following evidence:
The insignia were a prominent feature of each item so as to be visible to others when
worn, allowing the wearer to publicly express her allegiance to the organization.
Lindeburg never designated the merchandise as "official" Job's Daughters' merchan-
dise or otherwise affirmatively indicated sponsorship. Job's Daughters did not show a
single instance in which a customer was misled about the origin, sponsorship, or en-
dorsement of Lindeburg's jewelry, nor that it received any complaints about
Lindeburg's wares. Finally, there was evidence that many other jewelers sold unli-
censed Job's Daughters jewelry, implying that consumers did not ordinarily purchase
their fraternal jewelry from only "official" sources.
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Appeals in Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enterprises.8 9 Vuit-
ton, a famous maker of expensive luggage, handbags and related
items, had a registered trademark consisting of a design featuring
the initials "LV" superimposed one upon the other and sur-
rounded by flower-like symbols.'0 The design is repeated and cov-
ers virtually all of Vuitton's products.' 1 The defendant marketed a
line of merchandise decorated with a design strikingly similar to
that used on Vuitton's goods.2 Vuitton sued for trademark in-
fringement and false designation of origin under the Lanham Act,
and for unfair competition, claiming that the design used in its
manufacture is widely recognized as the Vuitton trademark.
In granting summary judgment for the defendant, the district
court declared the design functional and unprotectible, thus find-
ing the plaintiffs' trademark to be invalid.' The court of appeals
rejected the district court's finding that any design which enhances
the consumer appeal and saleability of the product is, as a matter
of law, a functional element of that product. 4 Instead, it defined
functional features as those "which constitute the actual benefit
that the consumer wishes to purchase, as distinguished from an
assurance that a particular entity made, sponsored, or endorsed a
product." '"
The Ninth Circuit concluded that the mark at issue could indi-
cate source, citing the fact that the mark was arbitrary, was regis-
tered as a trademark, and was specifically intended to indicate the
origin of the goods." The court rejected the defendant's contention
that a design is functional if it is related to the reasons consumers
purchase that product, stating that a trademark is always func-
tional in the sense that it helps to sell the product by identifying
its manufactuer and that the real policy is to avoid the use of a
trademark to monopolize a design feature which, in itself and
89. 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981).
90. Id. at 772.
91. Id.
92. Id. The court of appeals stated that "[t]he competing items appear to be identical
in size, shape, and configuration, and almost identical in design and coloring, so that
Young's merchandise can easily and readily be taken for that of Vuitton." The defendant
also promoted its collection through advertisements comparable to Vuitton's. Id.
93. Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., 280 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 98 (C.D. Cal. June
10, 1980), rev'd, 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981).
94. 644 F.2d at 773.
95. Id. at 774 (quoting International Order of Job's Daughters v. Lindeburg & Co., 633
F.2d 912, 917).
96. 644 F.2d at 774. The court of appeals based its assumption of origin on Vuitton's
early registration of the mark and the mark itself. Id.
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apart from its identification of origin, improves the usefulness or
appeal of the product.97 Furthermore, the court of appeals stated
that a trademark which identifies the source of goods and yet ful-
fills another function, such as decoration, may still be entitled to
protection."
After rejecting the defendant's arguments," the court of appeals,
held that the granting of summary judgment by the district court
was not proper since Vuitton had raised genuine issues of material
fact. 00 The court was persuaded by the fact that a registered
trademark is presumed to be valid'01 and the presence of evidence
in the record indicating that the pure aesthetic appeal of the plain-
tiff's trademark was slight.10 2 The case was then remanded for trial
on the issue of functionality.
Vuitton lessened the effect of Job's Daughters in two important
respects. First, the Vuitton court held that a trademark which cov-
ered the entire surface of a handbag or piece of luggage, and
would, therefore seem to serve an aesthetic purpose, could be enti-
tled to trademark protection. In comparison, Job's Daughters held
that a mark on a piece of jewelry was a functional aesthetic compo-
nent of the jewelry, thus not deserving of protection. The object of
comparison in these two cases is the visibility of the trademark on
the product it adorns. If a mark that covers the entire surface of a
handbag or piece of luggage is capable of serving as a trademark by
indicating origin, it should logically follow that a mark on a piece
of jewelry that is much less visible to the naked eye should be ca-
97. Id.
98. Id. at 775 (citing Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604
F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979)).
99. The court also disposed of the notion that Vuitton's design was functional because
it covered the entire surface of products which had to fulfill aesthetic requirements in order
to sell. 644 F.2d at 774-75. See supra note 44.
100. 644 F.2d at 775.
101. The court of appeals discussed the burden of proof as follows:
[U]nder the Lanham Act, registration and entry of a trademark on the Principal Reg-
ister of the United States Patent and Trademark Office shifts the burden of proof
from the plaintiff, who would have to establish his right to exclusive use in a common
law infringement action, to the defendant, who must introduce sufficient evidence to
rebut the presumption of plaintiff's right to such protected use.
Id.
102. Vuitton had submitted to the district court an affidavit of a buyer of luggage and
handbags for Saks Fifth Avenue, stating that "I seriously doubt that there is anyone who
would purchase a Vuitton product solely because they found the characteristic Vuitton
trademark to be aesthetically pleasing. Thus I believe that it is because the design associates
the products with Vuitton that it contributes to the commercial success of Vuitton's mer-
chandise." Id. at 776.
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pable of indicating source and not merely serve a functional
purpose.
Second, the Ninth Circuit appears to have retreated somewhat
from its language in Pagliero, which stated that a feature which is
an important ingredient in the commercial success of the product
should be permitted to be copied. 03 The Vuitton court expressly
rejected the district court's holding that any feature of a product
which contributes to consumer appeal and saleability of the prod-
uct is, as a matter of law, a functional component of the product. 04
This is an important consideration since the Job's Daughters court
relied on the Pagliero language in reaching its decision. In moving
away from the language in Pagliero, the Vuitton court recognized
that a functional feature may additionally serve as a trademark
and be protected as such. It is interesting to note that Job's
Daughters recognized this principle, 05 but given the factual set-
ting, adhered rigidly to the language of Pagliero in reaching its
decision.
C. Conflict Between the "Sports Cases" and "Analogous
Cases"
By comparing the "sports cases" with the "analogous cases,"
one can readily observe several problems with the Job's Daughters
decision itself, as well as a major factor which distinguishes the
"sports cases" from the "analogous cases". The first problem is
that the Job's Daughters court misinterpreted the holding of Bos-
ton Hockey to mean that a trademark owner has a complete mo-
nopoly over its use, including its functional use. 0 6 Influencing the
Ninth Circuit was the fact that Boston Hockey found confusion to
exist on the showing that consumers knew of the source and origin
of the trademark symbol, as opposed to the product itself. The
proper analysis of Boston Hockey, however, is presented by the
Rainbow case, decided more than a year after Job's Daughters.
Rainbow stated that Boston Hockey does not automatically equate
awareness of a symbol's origin with confusion sufficient to establish
trademark infringement, but rather asks the question whether
knowledge of the origin of the symbol supports the inference that
103. At least one court shares this view. See Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653
F.2d 822, 825 n.3 (3d Cir. 1981), where the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
design of the exterior housing of an outdoor wall-mounted luminaire was functional.
104. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
105. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
106. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
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many of the product's typical purchasers would believe that the
product itself originated with or was in some way associated with
the trademark owner.
The second problem with the Job's Daughters decision is that
the court applied too broad a view of functionality, permitting a
feature of a product to be copied if that feature is an important
ingredient in the commercial success of the product.107 Although
the Ninth Circuit in Vuitton retreated from this expansive view of
functionality," s the court of appeals did not expressly articulate
the reasoning for this retreat. A persuasive argument for a nar-
rower view of aesthetic functionality, however, is found in the
Third Circuit decison of Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Industries,
Inc.,' es which stated that a broad view of aesthetic functionality
provides a "disincentive for development of imaginative and at-
tractive design" because the more appealing the design, the less
protection it would receive. 10 Instead, the inquiry should be to
what extent the design feature is related to the utilitarian function
of the product or feature."' "When the design itself is not signifi-
107. Some support for a broad view of functionality can be found in the first RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS. "A feature of goods is functional.. . if it affects their purpose, action or
performance, or the facility or economy of processing, handling or using them; it is non-
functional if it does not have any of such effects." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 742 (1938).
This expansive view of functionality is further reflected in the comment to § 742, which
makes a reference to aesthetic functionality. "When goods are bought largely for their aes-
thetic value, their features may be functional because they definitely contribute to that
value and thus aid the performance of an object to which the goods are intended." RESTATE-
MENT OF TORTS, § 742, comment a (1938).
Section 742 is one of a group of sections on unfair competition and trade regulation
which were not included in the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS because these fields were
developing into independent bodies of law with diminishing reliance upon the traditional
principles of tort law. 4 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS 1-2 (1979) (introductory note).
108. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. The Ninth Circuit has recently af-
firmed its holding in Vuitton by once again rejecting the notion that any design which en-
hances the consumer appeal and saleability of a product is functional. See Fabrica Inc. v. El
Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1983) (in discussing the plaintiffs' claim for unfair
competition alleging infringement of trade dress, the Ninth Circuit stated that "this court
thus has specifically rejected the notion that a design feature is functional by definition if
increases appeal and sales of the product").
109. See supra note 103.
110. 653 F.2d at 825. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals further stated:
As our ambience becomes more mechanized and banal, it would be unfortunate were
we to discourage use of a spark of originality which could transform an ordinary
product into one of grace. The doctrine of aesthetic functionality need not be con-





cantly related to the utilitarian function of the product, but is
merely arbitrary, then it is entitled to protection as a design trade-
mark if it has acquired the distinctiveness necessary to achieve a
secondary meaning. 11 2 This is a better view of functionality.
Aside from the problems of the Job's Daughters decision itself,
one important factor remains which distinguishes the Boston
Hockey and the Illinois NFL Properties decisions from Job's
Daughters and Rainbow. In both Boston Hockey and NFL Proper-
ties, the respective courts were strongly influenced by the presence
of licensing of the team's trademarks and the control exerted over
third party use of these trademarks. In Job's Daughters and Rain-
bow, however, the plaintiff had permitted many jewelers, including
the defendant, to produce unauthorized fraternal jewelry bearing
the plaintiff's emblem. It was a result of this activity, rather than
the nature of the use of the trademark, that the trademark func-
tion of plaintiff's emblem had been diluted to the point that it no
longer was capable of indicating a single official source of jewelry
bearing the emblem. On the other hand, both the NHL and NFL
had established exclusive licensing bodies and had actively policed
their trademarks, " and it was these efforts of the NHL and NFL
which contributed significantly to the trademark character of the
NHL and NFL team symbols.
III. UNIFORMS
Two courts have been faced with the issue of whether trademark
rights exist in a uniform. The first case was before the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders,
Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd."' The plaintiff, a professional group
of cheerleaders 1 and wholly owned subsidiary of the Dallas Cow-
boys Football Club, brought an action under section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act 1 6 to prohibit the defendants from distributing or ex-
hibiting a motion picture film 1 17 featuring a uniform strikingly sim-
112. Id.
113. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
114. 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
115. The plaintiff employs 36 women whose primary duties are to perform dance and
cheerleading routines at Dallas Cowboy football games. Id. at 202.
116. The plaintiff proceeded under § 43(a) because it did not have a registered trade-
mark or service mark in its uniform at the time of the action. See supra note 16 and accom-
panying text.
117. The film was X-rated and consisted primarily of scenes depicting the sexual ad-
ventures of the cheerleaders, including footage in which the cheerleaders performed sex acts
while clad or partially clad in the uniform. The defendant also advertised the movie in
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ilar to that worn by the plaintiffs cheerleading group. " 8
In addition to performing at Cowboy football games, the cheer-
leaders had frequently appeared on television programs and had
made numerous commercial appearances at public events.119 Be-
cause of their national exposure through the news and entertain-
ment media,120 the plaintiff had also enjoyed national commercial
success in licensing others to manufacture and distribute items de-
picting Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders in their uniforms. In gaining
this exposure, the plaintiff had expended large amounts of money
to acquaint the public with its uniformed cheerleaders.1
21
The first issue faced by the court of appeals was whether the
plaintiff had a valid trademark in its cheerleading uniform. The
defendant argued that the uniform was a purely functional item
essential for the performance of cheerleading routines and there-
fore was not capable of serving as a trademark.122 While agreeing
with the defendant that a purely functional item may not become
a trademark, the court of appeals disagreed that all of the charac-
teristics of the plaintiff's uniform served only a functional purpose.
The court also rejected the notion that an item which is in part
incidentally functional is necessarily precluded from being used as
a trademark.
2 3
The court of appeals noted that the plaintiff did not claim a
trademark as to the clothing in general, but rather claimed a trade-
mark in the particular combination of colors and arrangement of
decorations that distinguished the plaintiff's uniform from those of
other cheerleading squads.12 4 The court stated that if the design of
an article is nonfunctional and has acquired secondary meaning, 125
marquee posters depicting the uniform. Finally, through these posters the defendant adver-
tised that the star of the movie was a former Dallas Cowgirl Cheerleader when in fact she
was never a Dallas Cowboys Cheerleader. 604 F.2d at 202-03.
118. The plaintiffs' uniform consisted of "white vinyl boots, white shorts, a white belt
decorated with blue stars, a blue bolero blouse, and a white vest decorated with three blue
stars on each side of the front and a white fringe around the bottom." Id. at 202.
119. The public events consisted mainly of sporting goods shows and shopping center
openings. Id.
120. The cheerleaders have gained national recognition from being associated with the
Dallas Cowboys, one of the most successful professional football teams in the last twenty
years.
121. 604 F.2d at 202.
122. Id. at 203.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. As to its finding of secondary meaning in the plaintiff's uniform, the court of
appeals stated that: "There is no dispute in this case that plaintiff's uniform is universally
recognized as the symbol of the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders." Id. at 203 n.5.
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the design may serve as a trademark even if the article itself is
functional.12 Concluding that an item which serves or performs a
function may also at the same time be capable of indicating spon-
sorship or origin, especially where the decorative aspects of the ar-
ticle are nonfunctional, 12 7 the court of appeals held that the plain-
tiffs uniform was an arbitrary design which made the otherwise
functional uniform trademarkable. 2 3
The defendant's next contention was that the Lanham Act re-
quired confusion as to the origin of the film and that in the instant
case no reasonable person would believe that the film originated
with the plaintiff. The court rejected this argument, stating that
the defendant read the Lanham Act confusion requirement too
narrowly, and that a consumer need not believe that the owner of
the mark actually produced and marketed the item in order to be
confused. Instead it is sufficient if the public believes the mark's
owner sponsored or otherwise approved the use of the trade-
mark.2 9 Because of the cheerleaders' popularity and the fact that
the defendant's uniform was almost identical to that of the plain-
tiff, the court of appeals concluded that the uniform depicted in
the film unquestionably brought to mind some type of association
with the Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders.130
The importance of the Dallas Cowboys decision is exemplified
by the regularity in which the case is cited as authority for several
principles of trademark law. First, the decision is a leading case for
126. Id. at 203 (citing Ives Laboratories, Inc. v. Darby Drug Co., 601 F.2d 631, 642 (2d
Cir. 1979), where the Second Circuit stated that nonfunctional colors of a drug capsule were
capable of serving as a trademark if they had obtained a secondary meaning). See also
Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1215 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 861 (1976) (Eighth Circuit held that the unique exterior design of a grain semi-trailer
was entitled to trademark protection even though the semi-trailer itself was functional).
127. This language of the court seems to indicate that the Second Circuit applied a
"utilitarian" view of functionality in reaching its decision. See supra note 32 and accompa-
nying text.
128. 604 F.2d at 204. In providing trademark protection for the plaintiff's uniform, the
court of appeals noted that although color alone is not capable of becoming a trademark, see
1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 7:16 at 178, a combination of colors together with a distinc-
tive arbitrary design may serve as a trademark. 605 F.2d at 204 n.6. See supra note 126.
129. 604 F.2d at 204. It appears to be well settled now that trademark law does not
just protect the producers of articles, but that the creation of confusion as to sponsorship is
also actionable. See Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., 644 F.2d 769, 775 (9th Cir.
1981); National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F.
Supp. 651, 659 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
130. 604 F.2d at 205. The court of appeals added that because of the pornographic
nature of the film, the resulting confusion had a tendency to injure the plaintiff's business
reputation. Id. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
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the proposition that a mark which serves some function may also
at the same time serve as a trademark indicating sponsorship or
origin."s" Second, the decision is one of the leading cases recogniz-
ing "confusion of sponsorship. 13 2 This is an important considera-
tion for the trademarks of professional sports teams because the
teams and leagues do not produce the goods bearing their trade-
marks, but rather license others to produce such goods.
Even though Dallas Cowboys did not involve the uniform of a
sports team, the decision lends direct support to the idea that the
overall uniform of a sports team is capable of serving as a trade-
mark. Although the uniform would provide the functional purpose
of clothing, the overall uniform design, having acquired secondary
meaning, would serve as a trademark indicating origin or sponsor-
ship in the particular team. Just recently, the United States Patent
and Trademark Office has recognized trademark rights in the
uniforms of NFL teams by granting several teams registered trade-
marks for their uniforms.'
In National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls
Sportswear, Inc., s4 the District Court for the Western District of
Washington was faced with the issue of whether trademark rights
existed in the team jerseys of the NFL. The plaintiffs, the Seattle
Seahawks football team and NFL Properties, Inc., the league's ex-
clusive licensing agent, brought suit for false designation of origin
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and for common law unfair
competition to enjoin the defendant from manufacturing or selling
NFL football jersey replicas. 35
131. See supra notes 122-28 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
133. The following NFL teams have secured federal trademark registration for their
uniform design: Baltimore Colts (U.S. Trademark Registration No. 1,217,896), Chicago'
Bears (No. 1,217,892), Cleveland Browns (No. 1,217,893), Los Angeles Rams (No. 1,217,887),
Philadelphia Eagles (No. 1,217,888), New York Giants (No. 1,217,891) and San Diego Charg-
ers home and away uniforms (Nos. 1,217,889 and 1,217,890). Applications for federal trade-
mark registration are pending for the remaining NFL teams. Telephone interview with
James Noel, Director of Legal Affairs for NFLP (March 7, 1983).
134. 532 F. Supp. 651 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
135. The plaintiffs also brought suit for infringement of their federally registered ser-
vice marks of the member clubs in violation of § 32(1) of the Lanham Act. The services
specified in the registration of "Seahawks" were entertainment services in the form of pro-
fessional football games and exhibitions. Noting that a trademark is used to identify goods
and a service mark is used to identify services, the district court held that plaintiffs' use of
their federally registered service mark as a trademark did not give them federally registered
trademark rights since the marks were used as to goods (NFL jersey replicas) and not as to
services. Therefore, the court concluded that recognition of any rights via plaintiffs' regis-
tered service marks would be inappropriate. Id. at 654-55 n.1.
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The district court found an NFL football jersey replica to consist
of four separate elements: official team colors of an NFL member
club,"'6 a large numeral, some type of sleeve design,13 7 and a de-
scriptive term which relates the shirt to an NFL team.1 -8 This de-
scriptive term could be an NFL full team name, a team nickname,
a city or regional designation, or the name of a team player. " 9 It is
the descriptive term that the, actual controversy was about, be-
cause absent the descriptive term, NFLP disclaimed any interest
in NFL football jersey replicas.14 0 The district court framed the
issue as whether the plaintiffs had trademark rights in the descrip-
tive terms when combined with the other three elements or a col-
orable imitation thereof.1
41
In addressing the plaintiffs' claims for false designation of origin
and unfair competition, the district court stated that the criteria
for each cause of action were essentially the same. First, the plain-
tiff must show secondary meaning in the use of the descriptive
terms in a football context. Second, the defendant's infringing use
must be shown to have created a likelihood of confusion. s4 2 To sat-
isfy this burden, the plaintiffs prepared a nationwide probability
survey.143
Noting that it would be impossible to bring every potentially
confused consumer into court, the district court acknowledged that
a survey can be highly probative on the issues of secondary mean-
ing and likelihood of confusion." 4 However, the court added that
136. See supra note 128.
137. The district court stated that the exact sleeve design was not significant, just that
an NFL football jersey replica usually has some design on the sleeve. In fact, neither the
defendant nor the plaintiffs' licensees copied the official stripe pattern of the NFL member
clubs. The court stated further that even if a sleeve design had been omitted, a finding of
infringement would not be precluded since the jersey would still be a colorable imitation of
plaintiffs' mark. 532 F. Supp. at 656 n.5.
138. Id. at 656.
139. Id. Although not mentioned by the district court, it should seem that a player
nickname should qualify as a descriptive term deserving of protection if that player's nick-
name is well known by the fans. Cf. Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379, 280
N.W.2d 129 (1979) (the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that a nickname was capable of
being protected under the theory of right of publicity, requiring that the nickname clearly
identify the wronged person); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 404 (1960) (Dean
Prosser stated "that a stage or other ficticious name can be so identified with the plaintiff
that he is entitled to protection against its use").
140. 532 F. Supp. at 656.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 657.
143. Id.
144. Id. (citing 2 J. McCARTHY, supra note 21, § 32:46 at 498).
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the survey must be fairly prepared and its results directed to the
relevant issues.1 6 Upon examining the plaintiffs' survey, 4 6 the dis-
trict court concluded that the survey was well-designed, thoroughly
executed, and had involved some of the best experts available.
4 7
Since the defendant offered no survey data to challenge the plain-
tiffs' survey, the plaintiffs' survey results were essentially un-
contested. 4
Based on the plaintiffs' survey, the district court held that the
plaintiffs had sustained their first burden, a showing of secondary
meaning in the use of the descriptive terms in the football con-
text."' The survey data indicated a significant association in the
public's mind between the jerseys and the NFL or member teams.
Depending on the descriptive term used, the associaton level va-
ried from fifty-five to eighty percent."50 The district court was not
at all surprised at the level of association between the jerseys and
the NFL. First, evidence was introduced at trial showing that the
descriptive terms were often used in everyday conversation to refer
to specific NFL teams."' Next, and most significantly, the defen-
dant admitted in its pleadings that it designed its jerseys to capi-
talize on the market of people wanting to associate themselves with
an NFL team."12
145. 532 F. Supp. at 657.
146. In assessing the plaintiffs' survey, the district court considered a suggested list of
considerations set forth in the HANDBOOK OF RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR THE TRIAL OF
PROTRACTED CASES (report of the Judicial Conference Study Group on Procedure in Pro-
tracted Litigation) 25 F.R.D. 351 (1960). The handbook recommends that the offerer of a
survey have the burden of establishing the following:.
First, the proper universe was selected and examined; second, a representative sample
was drawn from that universe; third, the mode of questioning the interviewees was
correct; fourth, the persons conducting the survey were recognized experts; fifth, the
data gathered were accurately reported; sixth, the sample design, the questionnaire
and the interviewing were in accordance with generally accepted standards of objec-
tive procedure and statistics in the field of such surveys; seventh, the sample design
and the interviews were conducted independently of the attorneys; and eighth, the
interviewers trained in this field had no knowledge of the litigation or the purpose for
which the survey was used.
532 F. Supp. at 657.
147. Id. at 657-58.
148. Id. at 658.
149. To establish secondary meaning, the plaintiffs' survey asked the following ques-
tion: "When presented with football replica jerseys do people associate such jerseys with the
National Football League or its franchised team?" Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. The court observed that the defendant stated the following in its motion for
partial summary judgment and in its trial brief:
"The good will and popularity generated by the NFL throuh [sic] the marketing of its
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The defendant argued, however, that the relevant inquiry for
secondary meaning was whether the mark primarily denoted to the
public that the jersey replica was produced, sponsored or endorsed
by the NFL team.1" Because the plaintiffs did not manufacture
the products in question, but instead licensed the right to manu-
facture them, the defendant concluded that there was no single,
though anonymous, source of the product.15 ' The district court re-
jected this argument, stating that trademark law protects the
sponsors of products as well as the producers of products. 155 Not-
ing the symmetry between the concepts of secondary meaning and
likelihood of confusion, the district court reasoned that the rele-
vant inquiry to establish secondary meaning in a sponsorship con-
text should be the same as the relevant inquiry to establish likeli-
hood of confusion in a sponsorship context.15 This would require a
showing that the public believed that the product bearing the
mark was sponsored or endorsed by the plaintiff. The court con-
cluded that the plaintiffs sustained this burden through its survey
data,15 7 indicating that approximately fifty percent of the inter-
viewees thought that manufacturers were required to obtain au-
thorization from the NFL or one of its member teams in order to
produce the jerseys.158
The plaintiffs' next burden was to establish that defendant's ac-
tivities created a likelihood of confusion. Applying a multi-factor
successful entertainment services. . . has had the side effect of creating a substantial
market for items an NFL fan oi other consumer would wish to have in order to iden-
tify with the NFL or one of its member clubs" and "Wichita Falls has a right to
compete in the NFL football jersey replica market .... " Defendant concedes in his
trial brief that "[i]t is beyond question that consumers purchase NFL football repli-
cas in order to associate themselves with NFL member clubs."
Id.
153. Id. at 658-59. The defendant disagreed that the proper inquiry for secondary
meaning was whether the public associated the products bearing the marks with the NFL or
a member team. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 659. See supra note 129.
156. 532 F. Supp. at 659.
157. The plaintiffs' survey asked people who had seen only "official" jerseys whether
they thought the company that had made the jersey had "to get authorization or sponsor-
ship, that is permission to make it?" If the interviewee answered that authorization was
needed, he was then asked from whom was the authorization obtained. Id.
158. Id. The overall belief level was approximately 50%. Specifically, 45.3% of those
who saw jerseys with a city name/regional designation, 55.5% of the interviewees who saw
the player name and 44.8% of those who saw the team name on the shirt, believed that the
manufacturer was required to obtain authorization from the NFL or a member club in order
to produce the NFL jerseys. Id.
954 Vol. 21:927
1983 Sports Trademark Protection 955
analysis, " the district court concluded that the plaintiffs had
demonstrated that a substantial number of the public at large and
purchasers of NFL football jersey replicas would likely be confused
by the defendant's product. Stating that the more arbitrary and
fanciful the mark, the stronger the mark, the court determined
that the team nicknames were extremely fanciful.'"e As to the city
names/regional designations and player names, the court held
these marks to be inherently nondistinctive.161 However, these
nondistinctive marks were entitled to trademark protection be-
cause the plaintiffs made a showing of secondary meaning for these
marks.16
The district court also noted the physical similarity between the
defendant's product and an "official" NFL football jersey rep-
lica,168 that the class of goods of the product were the same, and
that the marketing channels were similar.'" Next, the district
court found evidence of actual confusion to exist.' 5 Finally, and of
great import, the court concluded that the defendant intended to
appropriate the goodwill and reputation of the NFL.'" Although
such a showing is not necessary to establish likelihood of confu-
sion, the court stated that where such intent is shown, the infer-
ence of likelihood of confusion is readily drawn.1 6 7
159. The district court considered the following:
In order to determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion in a trademark in-
fringement case, the Court must consider numerous factors, including, inter alia, the
strength or weakness of the marks, similarity in appearance, sound, and meaning, the
class of goods in question, the marketing channels, evidence of actual confusion, and
evidence of the intention of defendant in selecting and using the alleged infringing
[mark].
Id. at 660 (citations omitted).
160. Id. The district court stated that: "Why one team is a bear and another a lion is
anyone's guess." Id.
161. Id. The city name/regional designations were inherently nondistinctive because
they described the geographic location of the team. 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 14:15
at 483-512. The players' names were inherently nondistinctive because they were personal
name marks. Id. § 13:2 at 445-50.
162. 532 F. Supp. at 660. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
163. 532 F. Supp. at 660. Small variations in design, strength and color were not sig-
nificant. Survey evidence corroborated this finding. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. Actual confusion was established through the testimony of a retail purchaser
and the survey itself. Id. at 660-61.
166. Id. at 661-62. The district court noted that the defendant was found in contempt
several times, that the demeanor of the defendant's witnesses was very questionable, and
that the defendant exhibited a general intent to manufacture its products to resemble NFL
football jersey replicas. Id.
167. Id. at 661. See infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
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In granting the plaintiffs relief, the district court rejected the de-
fendant's contention that the plaintiffs' trademarks were func-
tional. Citing Pagliero v. Wallace China Co.,'6" the district court
stated that functionality is not limited to utilitarian items, but also
includes features which are aesthetically pleasing. 69 However, the
court stated that an attractive feature is not functional per se, 1 °
and that a functional feature may additionally serve as a trade-
mark.' 7 ' The district court did not have to address the issue of
functionality, however, because even assuming that the marks were
functional, the court concluded that the plaintiffs established
trademark significance in their marks through a demonstration of
secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion.1
7 '
The Wichita Falls decision is significant in several respects.
First, in applying an aesthetic view of functionality, the district
court held that a mark which is an attractive feature could addi-
tionally serve as a trademark and be protected as such. Second, the
survey introduced by the plaintiff was one of high caliber which
established a strong association between the NFL football jersey
replicas and the NFL team. In future cases dealing with trade-
marks of any professional sport, the survey could be cited as rele-
vant authority for the proposition that the public purchases goods
bearing these marks to identify with their favorite sports team.'
On the other hand, the Wichita Falls decision could be construed
as requiring every plaintiff to conduct an expensive survey to es-
tablish secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion. This survey
requirement, however, would be burdensome and unnecessary in
light of other evidence a sports trademark owner could produce to
prove secondary meaning and likelihood of confusion.
7 4
Finally, because the defendant intended to appropriate the
goodwill and reputation of the plaintiffs, the district court stated
that where such intent is shown, there is a strong inference of a
likelihood of confusion. The district court noted that some author-
168. 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952).
169. 532 F. Supp. at 662.
170. Id. at 662-63 (citing Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d
Cir. 1981); Vuitton Et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1981)).
171. 532 F. Supp. at 663 (citation omitted).
172. Id.
173. Perhaps other courts could take judicial notice of this survey. Cf. North Am. Air-
coach Systems v. North Am. Aviation, Inc., 231 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1955), where the court of
appeals stated that the plaintiff had a worldwide significance and was so well known that
the court would have taken judicial notice of it if it had not been proven. Id. at 208.
174. See infra notes 196-210 and accompanying text.
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ity exists for the proposition that a showing of intent shifts the
burden to the defendant to prove that his efforts have not caused a
likelihood of confusion. This is an important consideration because
in almost every case of infringement of sports trademarks, the in-
fringer either copies the mark exactly or makes distinctions in the
product which have no real significance in the minds of consumers.
Such an intent should shift the burden of proof to the defendant
who is riding the coattails of the trademark owner.
175
IV. CONCLUSION: AN ARGUMENT FOR PROTECTION OF SPORTS
MERCHANDISING PROPERTIES
Aside from legal theories, there are relevant policy considera-
tions which provide support for the protection of sports merchan-
dising properties. First, and most important, fair competition re-
quires that those who invest time, money and energy into the
development of goodwill and a favorable reputation be allowed to
reap the advantages of their investment.176 Second, trademarks en-
courage the maintenance of quality by giving the producer the
benefit of the good reputation which such excellence creates and
by giving the consumer the benefit of quality goods.177 Oftentimes
an infringer produces and markets goods inferior to those of li-
censed manufacturers, thus tarnishing the trademark owner's rep-
utation and providing a disservice to the consumer. 17 Third, in-
fringers often use trademarks in a distasteful manner, which
175. See infra notes 206-10 and accompanying text.
176. The legislative history of the Lanham Act states:
Trade-marks, indeed, are the essence of competition, because they make possible
a choice between competing articles by enabling the buyer to distinguish one from
the other. Trade-marks encourage the maintenance of quality by securing to the pro-
ducer the benefit of the good reputation which excellence creates. To protect trade-
marks, therefore, is to protect the public from deceit, to foster fair competition, and
to secure to the business community the advantages of reputation and good will by
preventing their diversion from those who have created them to those who have not.
S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1946 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
1275. One of the stated purposes of the Lanham Act is: "[W]here the owner of a trademark
has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the public the product, he is protected
in his investment from its misappropriation by pirates and cheats." Id. at 1274.
177. As part of their merchandising program, trademark licensors normally establish a
quality control program. For example, NFLP maintains such a program to monitor the
quality and appearance of its licensees' merchandise. This program supplements whatever
quality control the individual licensees exercise. National Football League Properties, Inc. v.
Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 655 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
178. For example, the defendant in National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Dallas
Cap & Emblem Mfg., Inc., 26 Ill. App. 3d 820, 327 N.E.2d 247 (1975) was found to have
manufactured substandard emblems bearing plaintiffs' marks. Id. at 821, 327 N.E.2d at 249.
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tarnishes the trademark owner.17 9 Fourth, inferior and defective
goods may result in products liability actions against the sports en-
tity. 80 Finally, several of the prominent sports leagues have estab-
lished charitable foundations which receive a significant amount of
royalties paid by licensees. 181
The initial step in the recognition of legal protection for sports
merchandising properties is to find that a valid trademark exists,
whether federally registered or at common law.182 Only when a
valid trademark exists can infringement be proven. The main ob-
stacle to overcome in establishing trademark rights is the conten-
tion that the mark is functional and therefore not a valid
trademark.
As discussed earlier, functionality poses a problem for trade-
marks of professional sports only when courts apply a broad view
of functionality. 88 By permitting a feature of a product to be cop-
ied if that feature is an important ingredient in the commercial
success of the product, these courts provide a "disincentive for de-
velopment of imaginative and attractive design ' 18 4 because the
179. See, e.g., Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d
200 (2d Cir. 1979) (where the defendant produced a pornographic film depicting cheer-
leaders clad in plaintiff's cheerleading uniform); Chemical Corp. of Am. v. Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., 306 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1962) (where the defendant advertised its insecticide by chang-
ing plaintiff's famous slogan for its beer "Where there's life, there's Bud" to the slogan
"Where there's life, there's bugs"); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (where the defendant had manufactured a poster showing the familiar red
and white Coca-Cola design with the word "Cocaine" substituted for "Coca-Cola").
180. Although there have not been any products liability suits to date involving li-
censed goods bearing the trademarks of professional sports, the potential for such an action
is becoming greater with the expanded line of merchandise that sports trademarks are ap-
plied to. See Carter v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co., 360 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
(trademark licensor held strictly liable for injury caused by inflammable garment bearing
the mark "BAN-LON"); Kasel v. Remington Arms Co., 24 Cal. App. 3d 711, 101 Cal. Rptr.
314 (1972) (trademark licensor held strictly liable for defective ammunition manufactured
by its trademark licensee).
181. For example, National Football League Properties has established NFL Charities.
Since 1971, NFLP has donated almost five million dollars to charities such as the United
Way and the National Negro College Fund. National Football League Properties, Inc. v.
Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651, 655 (W.D. Wash. 1982). Major League
Baseball has also established a charitable foundation funded by royalties paid by licensees.
182. Federal registration gives a trademark owner four basic benefits: "it is notice to
the world of your claim; it creates presumptions as to ownership and the exclusive right to
use; it may, under proper circumstances represent conclusive evidence of your right to ex-
clusive use; it may be used as the basis for obtaining registrations in foreign countries." THE
U.S. TRADEMARK Ass'N, TRADEMARK MANAGEMENT, 26 (1981). Professional sports have recog-
nized the importance of federal trademark registration and secure federal registration for
their marks as the foundation of their merchandising program.
183. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 103, 109.
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more, appealing the design, the less protection it would receive.
The dissatisfaction with this view is evidenced by the fact that
many federal district and circuit courts have refused to adopt such
a broad view of functionality.' In addition to these courts, the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, 8 6 the International Trade
Commission,18 7 and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board 88
have also rejected a broad view of functionality. A prominent com-
mentator in the area of trademark law has advocated the rejection
of aesthetic functionality.18 9 In a recent Supreme Court case, the
majority, by way of dictum, appeared to adopt a utilitarian defini-
185. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus. Inc., 653 F.2d 822 (3d Cir. 1981); Vuitton
Et Fils S.A. v. J. Young Enters., 644 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1981); Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders,
Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979); National Football League Proper-
ties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear, Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
186. The Court of Customs and Patent and Patent Appeals has consistently rejected
the notion that any feature of a product which enhances it consumer appeal and saleability
is functional. See, e.g., In re Penthouse Int'l Ltd., 565 F.2d 679, 682-83 (C.C.P.A. 1977),
holding that the stylized key design feature on applicant's jewelry was entitled to registra-
tion, the court stated that "[t]he stylized key design in the present case may have the func-
tion of attracting purchasers, but the shape of the jewelry, like the mark, is arbitrary and
nonessential to a functioning piece of jewelry." Id. This view of the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals was recently affirmed in In re DC Comics, Inc., No. 82-528 (C.C.P.A. Sept.
30, 1982) (available Feb. 16, 1983 on LEXIS, Patcop library, Cases file), where the court
stated "[W]e consider such a broad definition [of aesthetic functionality] to be at odds with
this Court's precedent in this area."
187. See In re Certain Novelty Glasses, 208 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 830 (U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm. July 11, 1979) (design features on novelty glasses provided a distinctive appearance
by which consumers could identify the glasses as having emanated from one source and that
these features were arbitrary and had no relation to the functional aspect of the item).
188. See In re Paramount Pictures Corp., 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1111 (Pat. Off. Trade-
mark Trial and Appeal Bd. April 9, 1982) (placement of the mark "Mork & Mindy" on tee
shirts served primarily as an indicator of source despite its ornamental value); In re Olin
Corp., 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 182 (Pat. Off. Trademark Trial and Appeal Bd. Nov. 19, 1973)
(in addition to ornamenting the product, use of a corporate symbol on tee shirts was recog-
nized by consumers as indicating source or origin of the product).
189. One commentator has gone as far as advocating the complete rejection of aes-
thetic functionality. "A severe limitation, if not outright rejection, of the notion of 'aesthetic
functionality' is proper. The policy served by 'aesthetic functionality' is best dealt with by
the established rule of 'merely ornamental"'... 1 J. MCCARTHY, supra note 21, § 7:26 at 35
(Supp. Dec. 1982).
In his treatise, Professor McCarthy discusses the rule of "merely ornamental" as
follows:
Merely because a symbol may be pleasing to the eye, and is an ornamental feature of
a label, does not necessarily mean that that symbol cannot serve a trademark pur-
pose. A symbol or design which is only incidentally ornamental and decorative, can
still be a trademark. This means that such a symbol or design must have as its prin-
cipal function, the purpose of identifying and distinguishing the goods, rather than
only as a decorative feature as part of the 'dress' of the goods.
Id. § 7:6 at 162 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
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tion of functionality rather than an aesthetic definition.1 90
In comparison, a utilitarian view of functionality would pose no
problem because the trademarks of professional sports, when ap-
plied to various products, are arbitrary design features which have
no relation to the functional aspects of the product."' 1 However, it
would not be necessary to choose between the conflicting views of
functionality if the courts which apply aesthetic functionality
would recognize that a trademark can serve primarily as an indica-
tor of source despite its aesthetic value. The courts in Dallas Cow-
boys, Vuitton, and Wichita Falls all recognized the principle that
a mark which is an aesthetic feature of an article may primarily
serve as an indicator of source or origin and should be protected as
such. As long as the courts recognize the dual capacity of a trade-
mark, neither an aesthetic view nor a utilitarian view of functional-
ity will jeopardize the protection of sports merchandising
properties.192
Once a valid trademark is established, the trademark owner
must prove the elements of his particular cause of action. In the
case of federally registered trademarks, the basic test for federal
trademark infringement is whether the defendant's use of the
mark has caused a likelihood of confusion.' e5 For unregistered
190. Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 2182 (1982). In the
first trademark case heard by the Supreme Court in recent years, the Court did not reach
the trademark issues because it decided the case on narrow procedural grounds. In a foot-
note, however, the Court stated: "In general terms, a product feature is functional if it is
essential to the use or purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the article."
Id. at 2186 n.10. Professor McCarthy is of the opinion that this is a utilitarian definition of
functionality. 1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 21, § 7:26 at 32 (Supp. Dec. 1982). However, Jus-
tice White stated in his concurrence: "A functional characteristic is 'an important ingredient
in the commercial success of the product.'" 102 S. Ct. at 2192. Although appearing to adopt
a broad view of functionality, Professor McCarthy states that the quotation "should be con-
strued as an observation upon functionality rather than a definition of what is 'functional' ".
1 J. McCARTHY, supra note 21, § 7:26 at 32 (Supp. Dec. 1982).
191. For example, an article of clothing provides the same qualities to the wearer
whether the sports trademarks are applied or are not applied.
192. In many instances, a broad view of functionality operates to sanction conduct
that may cause a likelihood of confusion. This result is thought to be outweighed by the
increase in competition which follows from a principle that permits imitation. There is, how-
ever, authority which "supports the proposition that a court convinced that a defendant has
deliberately engaged in fraudulent or unethical conduct will often pay little or no attention
to functionality in prohibiting imitation." See Note, Unfair Competition, supra note 30, at
566-68. It is interesting to note that the courts in Boston Hockey, the Illinois NFL Proper-
ties cases, and the Washington NFL Properties decision all focused little attention on the
doctrine of functionality in prohibiting imitation. In each case, the court found that defen-
dant's conduct was less than desirable.
193. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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trademarks, the basic test is the same whether pursuing an action
for false designation of origin or for unfair competition. The plain-
tiff must first establish that his trademark has acquired secondary
meaning,' and then show that the defendant's activities have
caused a likelihood of confusion.195
A review of the case law involving the issue of secondary mean-
ing produces the conclusion that there is no set rule for determin-
ing if secondary meaning has been achieved. Courts generally place
great weight on direct evidence of buyer recognition obtained from
consumer surveys.196 Courts also look at indirect evidence of buyer
recognition, such as the length of time the trademark has been
used, the volume of sales, and the nature and extent of advertis-
ing.1 97 Survey evidence is prohibitively expensive to produce. For
example, the consumer survey presented in Wichita Falls cost over
one-half million dollars to prepare.9 s It is this author's contention
that survey evidence should not be required to establish secondary
meaning in the trademarks of professional sports. Instead, second-
ary meaning can be established through indirect evidence as de-
scribed above. Indeed, many courts have held that secondary
meaning existed in the absence of survey evidence, when a strong
showing of indirect evidence was presented. -99
194. See supra note 23.
195. See supra note 18.
196. See, e.g., National Football League Properties, Inc. v. Wichita Falls Sportswear,
Inc., 532 F. Supp. 651 (W.D. Wash. 1982); Dutka, The Use of Survey Research In Legal
Proceedings, 68 A.B.A. J. 1085 (1982).
197. See, e.g., American Scientific Chem., Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 690
F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1982); Parrot Jungle, Inc. v. Parrot Jungle, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 266
(S.D.N.Y. 1981).
198. Telephone interview with James Noel, Director of Legal Affairs for NFLP (March
7, 1983).
199. See, e.g., American Scientific Chem., Inc. v. American Hosp. Supply Corp., 690
F.2d 791, 793 (9th Cir. 1982) ("survey evidence would have inconvenienced customers and
been prohibitively expensive to produce. In view of the [indirect) evidence plaintiff has
presented, consumer testimony is not required to prove secondary meaning"); Parrot Jungle,
Inc. v. Parrot Jungle, Inc., 512 F. Supp. 266, 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("[tjhus from this evidence
of intentional copying, combined with the [indirect evidence] discussed above, I conclude
for purposes of preliminary injunction that plaintiff's mark has achieved secondary
meaning").
In Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1980), the court of
appeals found secondary meaning to exist in the plaintiff's pocket tab through the showing
of indirect evidence. The court stated:
The district court received copious evidence, direct and circumstantial, on the
use and recognition of the pocket tab mark. Use of the mark continuously for 44
years, sales of products bearing the mark of $500,000,000 in one year before suit, a
use on 500,000,000 garments between 1969 and 1977, and widespread advertising di-
rected to the mark, were among the facts of record. Based on that and further evi-
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Other courts have looked at the behavior of the second comer
and have found a presumption of secondary meaning by a showing
of deliberate and close imitation of the senior user's trademark. 00
It is a rebuttable presumption and the burden of proof will shift
back to the senior user if the junior user presents some probative
evidence. 0 1 In almost all instances, the second comer will copy the
sports trademarks intentionally and exactly. Such intentional cop-
ying should shift the burden of proof to the defendant because the
burden of litigation should not be on the trademark owner who has
invested significant amounts of money, time and energy to pro-
mote his trademark, but rather on the defendant exploiting this
investment. If the defendant shifts the burden back to the plain-
tiff, the sports trademark owner should then be able to show sec-
ondary meaning through indirect evidence.
The foundation of any cause of action is that the defendant's
activities have caused a likelihood of confusion. Similar to second-
dence, the court entered findings.. . in support of its conclusion. . . that "[the Levi
Strauss] pocket TAB trademark has acquired a secondary meaning in the market-
place and is distinctive of [Levi Strauss's] garments in commerce". None of the
court's findings being clearly erroneous, we shall not disturb that conclusion.
Id. at 821 (quoting Levi Strauss & Co. v. Blue Bell, Inc., 200 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 434, 444 (N.D.
Cal. July 14, 1978).
200. See, e.g., Audio Fidelity, Inc. v. High Fidelity Recordings, Inc., 283 F.2d 551, 558
(9th Cir. 1960) (affirmed the trial court holding that evidence which showed that exact copy-
ing by the defendant of the plaintiff's design had taken place, without any opposing proof,
was sufficient to establish a secondary meaning); RJR Foods, Inc. v. White Rock Corp., 603
F.2d 1058, 1060 (2d Cir. 1979) (in finding secondary meaning, the court of appeals stated:
"Finally, there was telling evidence that the defendant attempted to capitalize on the trade
dress of plaintiff's punch when it introduced its own punch"); Le Sportsac, Inc. v. Dockside
Research, Inc., 418 F. Supp. 602, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("[m]ost persuasive, however, is the
inference of secondary meaning that arises by virtue of defendant's own admissions and the
act of copying almost every detail of plaintiff's product"). The Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit stated it best:
We cannot conclude but that Maier deliberately adopted the name knowing that
Black & White was the name and trademark of Buchanan and they must have done
so with some purpose in mind. The only possible purpose could have been to capital-
ize upon the popularity of the name chosen. This popularity, they must have known,
would extend to their product because the public would associate the name Black &
White with something old and reliable and meritorious in the way of an alcoholic
beverage.
Fleischmann Distilling v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 157 (9th Cir. 1963) (footnotes
omitted).
In certain cases, New York state courts will grant relief without proof of secondary
meaning. The senior user will prevail if he proves that the junior user has indulged in some
type of predatory practice in addition to proving likelihood of confusion. For a discussion of
this principle, see Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., 618 F.2d 950, 952-54 (2d Cir.
1980).
201. See id.
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ary meaning, courts apply a multi-factor analysis to determine if
there is a likelihood of confusion.0 2 Once again, courts place great
weight on direct evidence obtained through consumer surveys. 03
Courts also look at indirect evidence of likelihood of confusion,
such as the strength of the plaintiff's mark, the degree of similarity
between the marks, the competitive proximity of the products, the
degree of care likely to be exercised by consumers, and the defen-
dant's purpose in adopting its mark.2" Survey evidence of likeli-
hood of confusion should not be required because the sports trade-
mark owner can make a strong showing of indirect evidence.206
Where intentional copying is shown, the inference of confusion is
readily drawn.2" Such copying will be presumed to have intended
to create a confusing similarity of appearance and will be pre-
sumed to have succeeded.2 7 This shifts the burden to the defen-
202. See supra note 18.
203. See supra note 196.
204. See, e.g., Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 381-82 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830 (1976). See supra note 18.
205. As to the degree of similarity between the marks, the sports trademark owner can
make a strong showing since the defendant will normally copy his mark exactly or with
small variations. Second, the sports trademark owner's goods and the defendant's goods are
in the same class of goods and are both marketed through similar channels. Third, consum-
ers shopping for goods bearing sports trademarks will not exercise a great degree of care
because the items are relatively inexpensive. Finally, the defendant usually adopts the
plaintiff's trademark to capitalize on the market established through the plaintiff's efforts.
Although dealing with fraternal jewelry, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
Supreme Assembly, Order of Rainbow for Girls v. J.H. Ray Jewelry Co., 676 F.2d 1079 (5th
Cir. 1982), recognized that sports trademark owners can prove likelihood of confusion
through indirect evidence, stating:
It is not unreasonable to conclude, given the degree to which sports emblems are used
to advertise teams and endorse products, that a consumer seeing the emblem or name
of a team on or associated with a good or service would assume some sort of sponsor-
ship or association between the product's seller and the team ....
Id. at 1085. The Rainbow court distinguished sports trademarks from fraternal emblems,
noting the finding of the district court that "It]he practice with respect to fraternal em-
blems, and, in particular, fraternal jewelry is markedly different." Id.
206. See, e.g., Perfect Fit Indus., Inc. v. Acme Quilting Co., 618 F.2d 950, 954 (2d Cir.
1980) ("[i]f there was intentional copying the second comer will be presumed to have in-
tended to create a confusing similarity of appearance"); HMH Publishing Co., v. Brincat,
504 F.2d 713, 720 (9th Cir. 1974) (quoting Fleischmann Distilling v. Maier Brewing Co., 314
F.2d 149, 158 (9th Cir. 1963) ("where such intent has been shown, the inference of likeli-
hood of confusion is readily drawn").
207. See, e.g., American Chicle Co. v. Toppa Chewing Gum, Inc., 208 F.2d 560 (2d Cir.
1953), where Judge Learned Hand stated:
[I]t is generally true that, as soon as we see that a second comer in a market has, for
no reason that he can assign, plagiarized the 'make-up' of an earlier comer, we need
no more; for he at any rate thinks that any differentia he adds will not, or at least
may not, prevent the diversion and we are content to accept his forecast that he is
'likely' to succeed.
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dant to prove that his efforts have been unsuccessful.2 0 8 If the de-
fendant shifts the burden back to the plaintiff to prove likelihood
of confusion, the sports trademark owner should then be able to
show likelihood of confusion through indirect evidence.20 9
To ensure a successful merchandising program, it is mandatory
that a sports merchandising property owner secure federal trade-
mark registrations as soon as possible so that any enforcement ac-
tion may be based on statutory as well as common law rights. Once
registration is obtained, the property owner should implement an
active enforcement program using all available resources to police
his property. 210 At first contact with an infringer, the property
owner should demand that the infringer cease his activities and
attempt to settle the matter without litigation.1 1 If the infringer is
unwilling to cooperate, the property owner should not hesitate to
pursue legal action against the infringer. At this point, the ball is
in the court's hands to decide the relevant issues of trademark law.
David M. Kelly
208 F.2d at 563. Judge Hand then referred to the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS:
[Olne may infringe another's trade-mark or trade name by adopting a confusingly
similar designation whether he does so innocently or for the purpose of deceiving
prospective purchasers. But his knowledge or purpose is an important factor in deter-
mining whether or not his designation is confusingly similar. . . . [I~f he adopts his
designation with the intent of deriving benefit from the reputation of the trade-mark
or trade name, his intent may be sufficient to justify the inference that there is con-
fusing similarity. Since he was and is intimately concerned with the probable reaction
in the market, his judgment manifested prior to the controversy, is highly persuasive.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729, comment f (1938).
208. "In effect, such a finding shifts the burden to the defendant to show that his
efforts have been unsuccessful." My-T-Fine Corp. v. Samuels, 69 F.2d 76, 77 (2d Cir. 1934).
See also HMH Publishing Co. v. Brincat, 504 F.2d 713, 720 (9th Cir. 1974).
209. See supra note 205.
210. The great amount of revenues absorbed by bootlegging is evidenced by the ag-
gressiveness in which trademark owners are pursuing these counterfeiters. The technique
being used to combat illegal copying is to obtain a seizure order to confiscate unlicensed
merchandise. Recently, NFL Properties obtained a seizure order to confiscate all unlicensed
goods bearing NFLP marks that were being sold outside an Oakland Raiders preseason foot-
ball game. Telephone interview with James Noel, Director of Legal Affairs for NFLP
(March 7, 1983). A seizure order is most effective against itinerant peddlers who disregard
court appearances. In many cases, the peddlers would be served with papers, throw them
away and sell their merchandise and disappear. See Boussett, Trademark Attorneys Get
Tough, NAT'L L.J. Dec. 21, 1981, at 1, col. 3.
211. The dispute could be resolved by a licensing agreement.
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